Abstract -The income of Puerto Rican affiliates of U.S. corporations is essentially untaxed by either Puerto Rico or the United States. This lowers the tax penalty on investment there, and also makes it attractive to shift reported taxable income from the U.S. parent corporation to the Puerto Rican affiliate. This paper investigates these two interrelated impacts of taxation by developing a structural econometric model of the joint decisions regarding investment and income shifting, and estimating the model using firm-level data on the activity U.S. corporations in Puerto Rico. The results suggest that the income shifting advantages are the predominant reason for U.S. investment in Puerto Rico.
I. Motivation
T HE WORLDWIDE pattern of tax rates and tax systems has two conceptually distinct impacts on multinational corporations. First, it affects the relative return to conducting real operations in different jurisdictions, and therefore the location of real activity. Second, given the location of real activity, taxes affect where taxable income is reported. Through the careful use of intracorporate transfer prices and financial policy, multinationals can reduce their worldwide tax burden by shifting taxable income into countries whose marginal tax rate is relatively low. 1 Because the ability to shift income is itself affected by the pattern of real operations, the two impacts of taxation are interrelated; the true effective tax rate on real investment must take account of the amount of income shifting facilitated by the investment. This paper investigates these two avenues of impact of taxation in the context of U.S. corporate investment in Puerto Rico. The income from this investment is essentially tax-free, providing an incentive for investment and income shifting that is estimated to have cost the U.S. Treasury $3.3 billion in 1993. The paper proceeds by first developing a structural econometric model that will allow the estimation of the effect on capital investment and income shifting of policies that affect both aspects of multinationals' choices. The model is then estimated with firm-level data on U.S. corporations' investment and income shifting to Puerto Rico.
The empirical results suggest that the income shifting advantages are the predominant reason for U.S. investment in Puerto Rico. Simulation analyses based on the empirical results indicate that the operating capital and payroll of Puerto Rican affiliates would be more than two-thirds lower in the absence of the income shifting advantages. Although the model developed here is general enough to apply to the joint investment and income shifting choices faced by multinationals worldwide, the tax treatment of U.S. possessions, including Puerto Rico, is unique, so that the quantitative results about the relative importance of real factors and income shifting cannot be generalized.
II. Review of Related Literature
Each of the two decisions-location of real activity and income shifting-has been investigated separately. In what follows we briefly review the empirical literature on each of these questions.
A. Effect of Taxes on Real Investment Location
Most of the research on this topic has focused on the effect of taxation on foreign direct investment (FDI) to and from the United States, using time-series data. No consensus has been reached on the magnitude or significance of the effect. The pioneering study of Hartman (1984) used annual data from 1965 to 1979 to estimate the response of FDI, separately for investment financed by retained earnings and by transfers from abroad, to three variables: the after-tax rate of return realized by foreign investors in the United States, the overall after-tax rate of return on capital in the United States, and the tax rate on U.S. capital owned by foreigners relative to the tax rate on U.S. capital owned by U.S. investors. He found both a positive association of the after-tax rate of return variables with FDI financed by retained earnings as a ratio to U.S. gross national product (GNP), and a negative association of the FDI-GNP ratio with the relative tax rate on foreigners compared to domestic residents. The model did not explain transfers from abroad as well as it does retained earnings.
Boskin and Gale (1987) reestimated Hartman's equation using updated tax rate and rate of return series, extended the sample forward to 1984 and, in some cases, backward to 1956, and experimented with a variety of alternative explanatory variables and functional forms. They concluded that, although the results are somewhat sensitive to sample period and specification, the qualitative conclusions of Hartman are fairly robust. Newlon (1987) discovered that the rate of return series used in the earlier papers had been miscalculated from the original Bureau of Economic Analysis data for the years [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] . Using the corrected series and extending the sample period to range from 1956 to 1984, Newlon's results differ significantly from those of Hartman and those of Boskin and Gale. In particular, the equation explaining transfers of funds fits poorly, and no estimated coefficient is significant. Slemrod (1990) updates and exReceived for publication May 11, 1995. Revision accepted for publication April 30, 1997. * U.S. Treasury Department and University of Michigan, respectively. We are grateful to Jonathan Parker for outstanding research assistance, and to Don Fullerton, Jack Mintz, Jeffrey MacKie-Mason, Don Rousslang, and several referees for comments on earlier drafts. Nothing in this paper should be construed as a Treasury Department position. 1 We do not distinguish between income shifting that is within the laws and regulations of the countries involved, and income shifting that is outside these rules. In the context of Puerto Rico, the case studied here, the intent of the law seems to be to limit, but not eliminate, the amount of income shifting; note, though, that the geographical ''location'' of income is a slippery concept to begin with. tends Hartman's aggregated analysis and concludes, contrary to the earlier studies, that U.S. tax rules are more successful in explaining transfers of funds than in explaining retained earnings by foreign investors. Slemrod also disaggregates inward FDI by the seven major investing countries, and fails to support the proposition, which follows from simple conceptual models, that FDI from countries that exempt foreign-source income from domestic taxation should be more sensitive to U.S. taxation than FDI from countries that tax worldwide income and offer a foreign tax credit to mitigate double taxation.
B. Effect of Taxes on Income Shifting
Differences in tax rates across countries also provide an incentive for transactions that are designed to reduce worldwide tax liability by shifting income out of high-tax jurisdictions to low-tax jurisdictions. For multinational corporations this can be accomplished either by financial structure or by the pricing of cross-border but intrafirm transactions.
There is considerable anecdotal evidence concerning tax-motivated income shifting by U.S. multinationals. Wheeler (1988) describes U.S. tax court cases where income was apparently shifted for tax reasons. In one example, in 1975 the U.S. pharmaceutical company G. D. Searle had an average return on employed assets of Ϫ42% in the United States compared to ϩ119% in Puerto Rico-a zero effective tax rate jurisdiction which is the focus of the following empirical analysis. Of course, anecdotal evidence does not establish the economywide prevalence of income shifting.
There have been three recent empirical attempts to uncover systematic, albeit indirect, evidence of income shifting. Grubert and Mutti (1991) , using data on U.S. multinationals' affiliates aggregated by host country, regressed two measures of affiliate profitability in 1982 against the host country's statutory corporate income tax rate (or tax holiday rate if one is generally available). They find a significant and large negative relationship between either measure of foreign taxes and either measure of reported foreign affiliate profitability or, in other words, that firms declare more income in low-tax jurisdictions. This is consistent with income shifting, and inconsistent with the usual presumption that, in order to equalize after-tax returns, higher tax rates will require higher pretax rates of return. Moreover, the magnitude of the estimated effect is large, such that a drop in the host country statutory tax rate from 40% to 20% is associated with an increase in the ratio of host country after-tax profits to sales from 5.6% to 12.6%, and an increase in the after-tax rate of return on equity from 14.2% to 20.7%. Clearly, these results imply that a lower tax rate is associated with a higher pretax rate of return, and do not simply reflect a smaller slice taken by taxation out of an unchanging level of profitability. Hines and Rice (1994) also analyze country-level aggregate data from 1982 on U.S. nonbank majority-owned foreign affiliates. They investigate the effect of host country tax rates on the location of U.S. multinationals' pretax nonfinancial profits, pretax financial profits (i.e., net of interest income), total profits, and factors of production. Using regression analysis, they find a negative relation between all of these variables and host country average tax rates.
The results in both Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) are consistent with the hypothesis that the reported income of U.S. multinationals' foreign affiliates tends to appear in those countries with low corporate income tax rates. However, neither paper provides a measurement of the extent of income shifting between the United States and other countries, an important policy issue in its own right and necessary for a more complete picture of income shifting by U.S. multinationals.
That task was begun in Harris et al. (1993) , who performed a regression analysis of a five-year panel of data for 200 large U.S. manufacturing firms. They found that U.S. tax liability as a fraction of either U.S. sales or U.S. assets (the ''tax ratio'') is related to the location of foreign subsidiaries in a way that is consistent with tax-motivated income shifting. Having a subsidiary in a tax haven, Ireland, or one of the ''four dragon'' Asian countries-all characterized by low tax rates-is associated with lower U.S. tax ratios, while having a subsidiary in a high-tax region is associated with higher U.S. tax ratios. These results suggest that U.S. manufacturing companies shift income out of high-tax countries into the United States, and from the United States to low-tax countries. Such behavior certainly lowers worldwide tax liabilities for larger U.S. manufacturing companies and appears to significantly lower their U.S. tax liabilities as well.
A critical assumption of the paper by Harris et al. is that the location of foreign subsidiaries is exogenous to the income shifting activities that occur for any given configuration of multinational operations. That exogeneity assumption is, strictly speaking, incorrect. For example, one of the attractions of Ireland as a place to locate manufacturing activity is the potential to shift income from high-tax countries into low-tax Ireland. More generally, the presence of real activity in a jurisdiction facilitates the placing of accounting profits there. To the extent that the placement of real capital in Ireland allows additional shifting, this is an implicit subsidy to investment. Clearly, then, the income shifting and real investment location decisions are joint.
In this paper we develop a simple theoretical model of the joint capital location and income shifting decision for a U.S. corporation considering locating a subsidiary in a low-tax country, and then estimate the model using firm-level tax-return panel data on a sample of U.S. corporations, a subsample of which have operations in Puerto Rico, a low-tax jurisdiction favored by many U.S. multinational corporations. Before beginning these tasks, we next discuss the institutional framework and the data used in the analysis.
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III. Some Background on Tax Aspects of Puerto Rican Operations
The United States levies tax on the worldwide income of its resident corporations, although the income of foreign subsidiaries, but not branches, is taxed only upon the repatriation of income to the U.S. parent corporation. In order to mitigate potential double taxation by both source and home countries, the United States offers a credit against U.S. tax liability (the ''foreign tax credit'') for income and withholding taxes levied by foreign governments, as long as these taxes do not exceed the U.S. tax liability on the foreign-source income. Although the actual tax system is much more complicated than this description suggests, in essence the income earned abroad by subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals is taxed by foreign governments, and the United States may impose a residual tax upon repatriation equal to the difference between the U.S. tax rate and the host country tax rate.
Income earned in Puerto Rico by U.S. multinationals is a striking exception to this general rule. The basic elements of Puerto Rico's special tax treatment, called the possessions tax credit, go back to the Revenue Act of 1921, when it applied mainly to the Philippines, then a U.S. possession. The current version of the possession exemption dates from the introduction of Section 936 in the Tax Reform Act of 1976, with significant changes in 1982 and 1986. If a U.S. corporation, usually the affiliate of a larger U.S. parent, elects to be a ''936 corporation,'' it obtains a full credit against the U.S. income tax of the tax that would otherwise be due on its active business income in Puerto Rico and on the financial income originating from retained earnings reinvested there. Thus, income earned in Puerto Rico is in effect completely exempt from U.S. corporate taxation. 2 In order to qualify for the credit, 80% of the corporation's income in the most recent three years must be possession source, and 75% must be active business income.
Note that the possessions tax credit is only valuable to the extent that the Puerto Rican government grants an exemption from its corporate tax as well. In fact Puerto Rico does grant full or partial exemptions to companies in manufacturing and in some tourist-oriented industries. (In 1987, 97% of all possessions credits were received by companies in the manufacturing sector.) Although Puerto Rico also collects a tollgate tax on repatriations, the sum of tollgate taxes plus any corporate taxes attributable to a less than full exemption amounted in 1989 to only 4% of aggregate possessions corporation net income.
Because of the exemption of Puerto Rican source income, a critical issue is how to determine what part of a multinational's income can be attributed to Puerto Rico. In the absence of careful rules, a corporation could locate high-margin manufacturing activities in Puerto Rico and, by allocating to the U.S. parent the cost of R&D and other intangiblecreating activities, report large amounts of (untaxed) income in Puerto Rico (recall the case of G. D. Searle cited in section IIB). The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 (TEFRA) introduced the basic scheme now used for determining how much income can be sourced in Puerto Rico. Under TEFRA, a corporation can elect either of two methods for the determination of income-''cost sharing'' or ''50-50 profit split.'' Under cost sharing, the 936 corporation makes a cost-sharing payment to its parent and in return is treated as the owner of any manufacturing intangible (such as a patent) associated with the possessions product. This kind of cost-sharing arrangement could not apply to marketing intangibles such as a brand name, and the guidelines that govern transfer pricing (in Section 482 of the tax code) therefore applied in these cases. From TEFRA until the Tax Reform Act of 1986 (TRA), the required cost-sharing payment was based on a formula equal to Puerto Rican sales multiplied by the ratio of worldwide R&D to worldwide sales in the product area. Because 936 corporations could put their most profitable products in Puerto Rico, the cost-sharing payment could be small compared to the income that was shifted. TRA specified that the cost-sharing payment must be no less than the armslength royalty for the intangible.
Under the 50-50 profit split method, the possessions corporation reports 50% of the combined taxable income earned by it and its U.S. affiliates from the sales of the possessions product to third parties. Income derived from manufacturing and marketing intangibles are not distinguished and are both included in the combined pool. Furthermore, any allocation of R&D expenses to the combined income pool is still based on a mechanical formula, now 120% of the worldwide ratio of R&D to sales. Under current rules companies that rely primarily on marketing intangibles tend to choose the 50-50 profit split method. In 1989, 62% of possessions sales were under the profit split. 3 Because of the special rules that apply to the sourcing of income to Puerto Rican possessions corporations, income shifting to Puerto Rico and the other possessions is different from the shifting of intangible income to other foreign locations. In particular, under the 50-50 profit split method, income shifting is sanctioned by the Internal Revenue Code. One remaining area of dispute between the companies and the Internal Revenue Service is the proper allocation of expenses to the pool of combined taxable income.
3 After the period studied here, further changes in the law governing possessions corporations were made. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993 made a significant reduction in Section 936 benefits. Beginning with 1994, taxpayers had to choose one of two alternative schemes for calculating their allowable possession credits. Under the economic activities limitation, the prior law credit is limited to 60% of total wages (plus fringe benefits) and a specified percentage of depreciation expenses. Companies with substantial activity in the island in relation to their previous credits may not suffer any cutback at all. The other alternative was a straight percentage of the prior-law credit, phasing down to 40% in 1998.
EFFECT OF TAXES ON INVESTMENT AND INCOME SHIFTING TO PUERTO RICO
In the presence of these rules, U.S. companies have apparently been able to shift substantial amounts of intangible-asset-related income to Puerto Rico. The U.S. Treasury Department (1991) has estimated that in 1987 tax benefits per worker were $16,835, or about 95% of labor compensation. In some sectors, the tax cost per job was particularly large, for example, $70,788 in pharmaceuticals.
Another indicator of the amount of intangible income shifted to Puerto Rico can be obtained by looking at the reported operating rate of return of possessions corporations, defined as the ratio of net taxable income plus interest paid and less interest received to the sum of inventories, depreciable assets before depreciation, land, and depletable assets. Table 1 presents the 1987 operating rate of return of possessions corporations for the major industry categories in Puerto Rico. The average annual return in manufacturing was 98.5% and, as expected, was very high in hightechnology industries such as drugs and electronics. It was even 56.4% in apparel, which would normally be considered a mobile industry with relatively few significant intangibles. These data suggest that some sort of intangible, whether manufacturing or marketing, is significant for almost all companies that move to Puerto Rico.
IV. Data Used in the Analysis
The basic data source is a 1987 file of 419 Section 936 companies in manufacturing. These comprise all of the manufacturing companies claiming a possessions credit with fiscal years ending from July 1, 1987 , to June 30, 1988 . The file includes information from the corporations' basic corporate tax returns as well as from forms specific to possessions corporations that give the details on how possessions income is determined. The possessions corporations' tax return data were then linked to tax return data of their parent corporations. 4 Finally, the data on all possessions corporations owned by a given parent were aggregated. This procedure produced a sample of 214 corporations owning possessions corporations, and accounted for 96% of all possessions credits claimed in 1987.
In addition, the basic 1987 corporate tax file was used to provide the universe of ''nonparents,'' that is, U.S. corporations who could potentially have located in Puerto Rico. All companies in manufacturing on the Treasury corporate file with total assets in excess of $1 million were included in the group of potential movers; this amounted to about 8000 corporations. At this stage it was necessary to limit the analysis only to parents that had filed a consolidated tax return, as unconsolidated returns would not give a true picture of the parent's profitability and activities. For example, in some cases a possessions corporation was owned by an unconsolidated U.S. affiliate of the parent that was used as a holding company for offshore operations. The U.S. affiliate might perform little R&D on its own, even though the parent has a large research program. The elimination of nonconsolidated companies left approximately 4000 potential ''movers'' and 150 parents with possessions corporations. The latter account for 88% of all possessions credits and 85% of the operating assets of possessions corporations in Puerto Rico.
One of the relevant variables on the corporate file is qualified R&D for the purpose of the R&D tax credit. However, in some cases no qualified R&D is listed, even though the company in fact had substantial R&D expenditures. For one of several reasons, the company may not be claiming a research credit in a given tax year. Accordingly, Compustat data for 1987 was used to correct this problem. From the companies that had positive R&D in Compustat and positive qualified R&D in the tax file, we found that qualified R&D was on average 50% of the Compustat entry. (Some types of R&D do not qualify for purposes of the credit.) Thus, for those companies for which positive R&D was given in Compustat and no qualified R&D was listed in the tax file, an R&D value of one-half of the Compustat entry was substituted in the tax file. 5 The analysis that follows makes use of several variables used to indicate the relative profitability of locating real operations in Puerto Rico. The first is a measure of transportation costs by industry (TRANA), for which the basic source is Rousslang and To (1993) . 6 For U.S. imports, they calculate the sum of international freight costs, taken from customs declarations, and domestic transport expense as a percent of the consumer price. However, since sales price enters the denominator, this measure may pick up the influence of intangibles. For example, one can imagine the invention of a new drug that sells for a very high price but is 4 In some cases this link could be performed by computer using the parent's identifying number provided by the possessions corporation. In other cases it was necessary to use financial directories of corporate ownership.
5 For those companies with listed qualified R&D, a regression of it on Compustat R&D and a constant produces a coefficient of 0.507 on the former, and a t-statistic of 62.3. In order to test the importance of this imputation, the basic estimating equations reported below were also run using only those observations for which no R&D imputation was required. The results, including the coefficient on the R&D variable itself, were very similar to those based on the entire sample, and so are not reported here. 6 The expected sign on a measure of transportation costs is not clear. If the alternative production locale is the United States, then high transportation costs would make Puerto Rican production less attractive; if the alternative is, for example, Singapore, Puerto Rico looks relatively attractive for goods with high transportation costs. 
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otherwise the same as old ones in physical appearance and weight. The Rousslang-To measure of transportation costs would decline, although this change is attributable solely to the invention. In order to mitigate this problem, we adjust their transportation cost variable by dividing it by the ratio of the cost of goods plus depreciation expense to sales. Thus, if prices increase but manufacturing costs per unit remain constant, the variable would be unchanged. The average hourly wage rate of production workers published by the Bureau of Labor Statistics in Employment and Earnings (EARN ), by industry, is used as an indicator of the skill requirements for workers in the potential Puerto Rican operation. The emphasis is on production workers because research, marketing, and other headquarters functions can still be performed by the parent. A dummy variable (DSTART), equal to 1 only if the parent was incorporated within the last 10 years, is used to account for the possibility that new operations may have a lower actual rate of return than otherwise. Finally, the ratio of cost of goods sold (direct labor plus materials), as reported on the corporate tax return, to operating capital (the sum of gross depreciable assets, before depreciation, inventories, gross depletable assets, and land) (COS) is used to measure the importance of manufacturing costs per unit of capital. Note that among the expense items not included in cost of goods sold are advertising and marketing expenses, R&D, and other general and administrative expenses. 7 We also analyze the effect of three indicators of the importance of intangible assets. They are RD, the ratio of the parent's R&D expenditures to the parent's sales; AD, the ratio of the parent's advertising expenditures to its sales, 8 and PK, the ratio of consolidated gross profits (sales less cost of goods sold) to operating capital. This last variable is intended to reflect the pool of income that can potentially be shifted to Puerto Rico per unit of operating capital. Table 2 presents the mean values of these parent firm characteristics, separately for parents with Puerto Rican affiliates and those without. The indicators of intangible intensity, RD, AD, and PK, are clearly higher for those firms that maintain operations in Puerto Rico. These firms also feature lower transportation costs, slightly higher average hourly wage rates, and lower manufacturing costs per unit of capital.
V. Empirical Model and Estimation Results
A. Location Decision
We begin with a simple model in which the scale of the prospective Puerto Rican investment is predetermined. The firm makes only two choices: whether or not to locate in Puerto Rico and, if it does locate there, what rate of return to report. We further assume that the firm's total reported profits sum to its total actual profits, so that profits cannot be hidden from tax authorities, just moved between Puerto Rico and the United States. 9 The aftertax profit from operating in Puerto Rico, net of the opportunity cost of capital, has four components: the return if profits were sourced according to economic principles, (plus) the tax saving from shifting U.S. earnings to Puerto Rico, (less) the cost of shifting income, and the opportunity cost of capital:
where f p is the actual pretax average product of capital in Puerto Rico, K p is capital in Puerto Rico (assumed for now to be predetermined), t is the statutory tax rate in the United States, r p is the reported rate of return in Puerto Rico, i is the opportunity cost of capital, and C is a function representing the cost of shifting income. 10 C can be thought of as the expected penalties imposed by the tax authorities on any income shifting termed ex post to be illegal, plus any internal costs of income shifting, such as those associated with keeping two sets of books or with the disruption of optimal internal decisions caused by tax-driven transfer prices. 11 7 We investigated various other plausible proxies for the real attractiveness of Puerto Rico, such as labor intensity of the parent firm, that were not found to be importantly related to the probability of locating there.
8 Scaling R&D and advertising by capital, rather than sales, yields quantitatively similar conclusions. 9 Although the alternative to investment is referred to as the United States, the critical assumption is that there is a constant opportunity cost to investments in Puerto Rico. Part of the return in other low-tax countries, such as Ireland, might include the gains due to income shifting. 10 Puerto Rico is assumed to levy an average tax rate of zero on f p K p . In fact the Puerto Rican tax rate is small, but positive; this assumption simplifies the analysis.
11 Some of the cost of shifting may be deductible from taxable income. We have chosen to assume that any such costs are subtracted from Puerto Rican income, which is untaxed. Allowing some of the cost of shifting to 
The total cost of income shifting is presumed to be proportional to K p , and to be a quadratic function of the difference between the reported rate of profit and the actual rate of return on capital. We also posit that the cost of shifting is inversely proportional to a linear function of an indicator of the importance of intangible assets, here denoted by Q. Recall that the presence of intangible assets facilitates (i.e., decreases the cost of) income shifting.
A critical assumption of this model is that while Q affects the cost of income shifting, it is not a factor in the relative attractiveness of locating real investment in Puerto Rico. This seems a highly plausible assumption, as little investment in intangibles such as R&D occurs in Puerto Rico. 12 It is also unlikely that Puerto Rico has a comparative advantage for manufacturing of intangible intensive products. In fact, many relevant costs, such as for electric power, are substantially higher in Puerto Rico than in the United States; furthermore, Puerto Rican workers are subject to the U.S. minimum wage. We believe that there are no cost advantages to intangible-intensive manufacturing in Puerto Rico that could conceivably explain the reported rates of return in Puerto Rico which are, as shown in table 2, on the order of 10 times as high as those reported by their U.S. parents.
Our parameterization of the cost of income shifting is
The form of the C function is a key element of the model. As shown in Slemrod (1994) , what is critical are ѨC/ѨK p , income shifting (defined as S, equal to ( f p Ϫ r p )K p ) held constant, and ѨC/ѨS, K p held constant. In the formulation of equation (3), ѨC/ѨK p is negative, because a given amount of shifting is less costly when K p increases and ( f p Ϫ r p ) declines to keep S constant. The value of ѨC/ѨK p is an implicit subsidy to K p that lowers the effective cost of capital. 13 That ѨC/ѨK p is negative is plausible because the amount of allowable income shifting to Puerto Rico is certainly related to the real operating capital located there. The particular functional form is a simple version which captures the critical relationship that increased real capital reduces the cost of a given amount of shifting. Other functional forms which retain this feature will likely yield qualitatively similar results.
The firm has a two-stage decision process. First, it must calculate the optimal rate of return to report r p conditional on locating in Puerto Rico. Then it calculates net profit, given the optimal r p . If net profit is positive, it locates in Puerto Rico; if it is negative, is does not locate there.
Optimal r p , denoted by r* p , is found by deriving the appropriate first-order condition from equation (1),
Substituting this expression for r p into the aftertax profit, per unit of K p , yields
The first term of equation (6) represents the actual after tax profitability of operations, the second term represents the gross return to the optimal amount of income shifting, and the third term represents the cost of that income shifting. Due to the simple quadratic cost function, the cost of that income shifting is exactly half of the gross benefit, so that the net benefit is one-half the gross benefit.
The value of ⌸ p is not observable. We do, though, observe which firms choose to locate in Puerto Rico, which indicates that ⌸ p is positive. To operationalize the model, we assume that X 1 consists of the variables EARN, TRANA, COS, and DSTART, defined in section IV, plus a scale variable LNK, which is the logarithm of consolidated operating capital. Q, the indicator of the presence of intangibles, is posited to be a linear function of the three measures of the importance of intangibles discussed in section IV-RD, AD, and PK. 14 With these assumptions, the right-hand side of expression (6) consists of a constant term (which includes i), the variables in X 1 (EARN, TRANA, COS, DSTART, and LNK ), a constant times t 2 (denoted by TS), and the variables in Q be deductible from the parent's taxable income would complicate the model without changing its qualitative implications.
12 One referee suggested that DSTART could be associated with the benefits of income shifting; if so, the estimates of the effect of eliminating income shifting are misstated. However, if a DSTART value of 1 indicates that the parent has not yet had the time to develop an intangible asset worth transferring to its subsidiary, given its current expenditure on R&D, the negative estimated coefficient on DSTART means that we are underestimating the impact of income shifting.
(RD, AD, and PK) multiplied by TS, as follows:
Unfortunately the statutory tax rate in the United States is the same for all firms. The only possible source of tax differentiation is that, for firms with nonpositive taxable income, the current tax rate for an additional dollar of income is zero. However, because losses can be carried forward (without interest), the real tax rate is probably nonzero, although it differs across firms with current losses depending on their expected future loss position. Because it is the best, although imperfect measure of the tax rate, we define TS as a dummy variable equal to 1 except for firms with a net operating loss, in which case it is equal to 0. Because TS is such a noisy measure of t 2 , we estimate a modified version of equation (7) that includes RD, AD, and PK as explanatory variables not interacted with TS. We have also estimated, though do not report, a version where the variables RD, AD, and PK were multiplied by TS, as in equation (7). These results were not qualitatively different from those reported below, although the fit of the equation declined, suggesting that the TS variable does not adequately capture the tax incentives for shifting income.
The results of the probit estimation of equation (7) are displayed in column (1) of table 3. Note that, as the theory suggests, there is a positive coefficient on each of the indicators of Q. Each coefficient estimate is also statistically significantly different from zero at a 95% confidence level. The presence of intangible assets is apparently an important determinant of the decision to locate an affiliate in Puerto Rico. Because, by assumption, there is nothing about Puerto Rico that gives it a comparative advantage for intangiblerelated production, we conclude that this is strong evidence that income shifting is the underlying motivation for this behavior.
We next use the probit estimates to simulate the effect of removing the tax benefit of income shifting. We do this by calculating, firm by firm, the estimated probability of locating in Puerto Rico when Q ϭ t ϭ 0, thus setting the net benefit of income shifting in equation (6Ј) to 0. This is accomplished by setting RD, AD, and PK, and TS to zero. The first column of table 4 shows, by industry, the simulated impact of this policy on the number of U.S. firms that would continue to operate in Puerto Rico. 15 The simulations suggest that nearly half of all U.S. firms in Puerto Rico are there solely for the income shifting benefits, with the fraction rising to 80% for pharmaceutical companies. 16 An important caveat applies to these simulations, as well as to those reported below. It is that they are partial equilibrium in nature, in the sense that we assume that any 15 This result, and all of the simulation results in table 4, are point estimates only, and are subject to error because of the imprecision of the parameter estimates. Note, though, that the parameter estimates for the variables in the Q vector are large relative to their standard errors. On the other hand, the simulations refer to values of the independent variables which are far from their means, increasing the variance of any prediction. 16 If U.S. companies are attracted to Puerto Rico simply because of the tax exemption, unrelated to the opportunities for income shifting, then companies intensive in tangible capital should be heavily represented. To explore this possibility, in some of the analyses various measures of the parent's capital intensity were used as explanatory variables. The coefficientfor inventory intensity was always close to zero. The coefficients for plant and equipment intensity were sometimes significant, but negative. This suggests that heavy reliance on tangible capital is, if anything, an impediment to location in Puerto Rico. Companies do not appear to locate in Puerto Rico because of the ''basic'' exemption for capital income. While a complete general equilibrium analysis would certainly dampen the effects we have simulated, we believe the adjustment would not be large. First of all, minimum wage laws would mitigate the decline in real wages. Second, our own analysis 17 failed to uncover any evidence that labor-intensive firms are attracted (on average) to Puerto Rico, presumably because there are many alternative lowwage locations. Finally, note that the average tax benefits of Section 936 are as much as 95% of total compensation, much larger than the plausible decline in wages caused by a flight of U.S. possessions corporations. We are not asserting that the reduction in employment will not be largely offset by increased hiring by some firms; the new employers are not likely to have U.S. parents, though.
B. Scale of Operation
To this point we have assumed that the scale of operations in Puerto Rico is determined independently of tax policy. In this section we generalize that assumption by allowing K p to be a choice variable of the firm. We make optimal scale determinate by positing that each firm's Puerto Rican investment has diminishing returns, so that
The firm's two-step decision process is slightly modified. It must first decide on optimal r p and K p , conditional on operating at all in Puerto Rico. It then decides whether to go to Puerto Rico at all, depending on whether its net addition to profits would be positive.
Because both the marginal costs and the marginal benefits of income shifting have been assumed to be proportional to K p , allowing it to be endogenous does not change the condition for optimal r p , as shown in expression (5). The optimal value for K p is
According to equation (9), the optimal size of the operation in Puerto Rico is positively related to the potential gain from income shifting, just as is the potential profit from being there. This follows from the assumption that the costs of income shifting are proportional to K p . The large bracketed item in the numerator can be thought of as an ''income shifting adjusted cost of capital'' (ISACC), because it shows the effective cost of capital considering the net of cost income shifting gain per unit of capital, at the optimal amount of shifting. 18 We next estimate equation (9) as a tobit equation, utilizing the same right-hand-side variables as in the probit equation above. 19 The results of this procedure are displayed in column (2) of table 3. 20 Note that, for each variable, the estimated coefficient has the same sign and relative proportion in this equation and in the probit equation, a result that is consistent with the simple model outlined here. Thus the model, when expanded to include the choice of scale of operations, remains strongly consistent with the hypothesis that income shifting is a predominant reason for locating operations in Puerto Rico.
Columns (2) and (3) of table 4 show the results of repeating the simulation exercise of eliminating any benefit to income shifting, making use of the tobit coefficient estimates. In calculating the impact on employment, we assume that the ratio of employment to operating capital in Puerto Rico is the same as that of the parent in the United States. In fact, this is approximately true for the companies actually in Puerto Rico. These simulations show an even larger negative impact of this policy, because not only do we simulate that many firms would cease operations completely, but also that most of those that stay would reduce the size of their operations.
VI. Conclusions
A country's tax structure affects both the attractiveness of real investment and the incentive of multinational corporations to report income in the jurisdiction. For a firm these decisions are interrelated, because the opportunity to shift income into a low-tax jurisdiction makes real investment more attractive than otherwise. This paper presents a theoretically consistent and empirically tractable model of the joint investment location and income shifting decisions of a multinational firm. The model is applied to micro-level data for 1987 on U.S. corporations and their investments in Puerto Rico. The model fits the data well, confirming that, ceteris paribus, investment in Puerto Rico is attractive to those firms which can take advantage of the income shifting opportunities offered by the ownership of intangible assets. Simulations based on the statistical results suggest that a large fraction of U.S. investment in Puerto Rico is due to the income shifting opportunities. 21 Although the tax treatment of U.S. possessions corporations is unique, the model developed here is general enough 17 Discussed in footnote 6. 18 Hines and Rice (1994) derive a similar expression. 19 We do not include industry dummy variables as explanatory variables because their economic role would not be interpretable. A positive coefficient on an industry dummy variable may indicate intangibles and the benefits of income shifting, or alternatively operating cost advantages. 20 The simulations report the change in the unconditional expected value of the scale of investment in Puerto Rico, as derived in Maddala (1983, p. 159) . 21 In Grubert and Slemrod (1994) we report simulations of replacing the benefits of income shifting with a 50% wage credit. We find that the total number of firms and operating capital would decline slightly, but that the payroll of U.S. affiliates would increase by almost 50% as labor-intensive activities replace intangible capital-intensive activities. Sectional differences are important-the pharmaceutical sector would shrink, while the apparel sector would expand.
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THE REVIEW OF ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS to apply to the joint investment and income shifting choices faced by all multinationals. It implies that the effective cost of capital for investment in a given jurisdiction ought to reflect not only the traditional tax aspects, but also the income shifting opportunities that are facilitated by the presence of real operations in the jurisdiction. We recognize, though, that because of the specific rules governing income shifting between the United States and Puerto Rico, the quantitative results do not generalize to statements about the relative importance of real factors and income shifting for the overall global location activities of multinational corporations.
